Summary

  • Ethnic groups, on moving to a new location, choose one profession exclusively. Mostly because they see someone from their own ethnicity as role model. e.g. In NY, Koreans dominate deli and grocery. Chinese run laundries. Sikhs and Pakistanis drive cabs.
  • Patels got into motel business and when world was facing recession, they bought them cheap. Worked with full family. Decreased the operating cost, then gave lowest costs. That way one worked and they got into owning almost all motels. If Patel cannot make motel run profitably, no one can.
  • Very asymmetric risk to reward ratio.
  • Business with minimal capital and virtual no risk is Dhandho Investing.
  • Richard Branson did Virgin* business solely based on that.

Highlights

If we examine the history of ethnic groups migrating to alien lands, we notice a pattern: In Chicago, many of the early Irish immigrants became police officers while most housemaids were Polish

In New York City, Koreans dominate the deli and grocery business, Chinese run many of the city’s laundries, and Sikhs and Pakistanis drive most of the cabs

The reason we end up with concentrations of ethnic groups in certain professions is because role models play a huge role in how humans pick their vocations

Motels are heavily dependent on discretionary spending. The recession, coupled with rationed and sky-high gas prices, led to huge drops in occupancy. Many small, nondescript motels were foreclosed by banks or went on sale at distressed prices

Papa Patel sees this small 20-room motel on sale at what appears to be a very cheap price and starts thinking. If he buys it, the motivated seller or a bank will likely finance 80 percent to 90 percent of the purchase price. His family can live there as well, and their rent will go to zero. His cash requirement to buy the place is a few thousand dollars. Between himself and his close relatives, he raises about $5,000 in cash and buys the motel

Papa Patel lets all the hired help go. Mama and Papa Patel work long hours on the various motel chores, and the kids help out during the evenings, weekends, and holidays. Dahyabhai Patel, reflecting on the modus operandi during the early days, said, “I was my own front-desk clerk, my own carpenter, my own plumber, maid, electrician, washerman, and what not.

Papa Patel’s motel has the lowest operating cost of any motel in the vicinity. He can offer the lowest nightly rate and still maintain the same (or higher) profitability per room than his predecessor and competitors

They are busy with the motel day and night, so they have little time for recreational activities. As a result, the total living expenses for this family are abysmally low. With a single beater car, no home mortgage, rent, or utilities, and zero commute, eating out, or spending on vacations or entertainment of any type, Papa Patel’s family lives quite comfortably on well under $5,000 per year

Prices are far lower in the 1970s—the minimum wage is just $1.60. The best Papa and Mama Patel could hope for is total annual earnings of about $6,000 per year if they both take up jobs and work full-time. If they buy a 20-room motel at a distressed price of $50,000 with about $5,000 in cash and the rest financed, even at rates of $12 to $13 per day and 50 percent to 60 percent average occupancy, the motel will generate about $50,000 in annual revenue. In the early 1970s, with treasuries

The annual return on that $5,000 of invested capital is a stunning 400 percent ($20,000 in annual returns from the investment—$15,000 in cash flow and $5,000 in principal repayment

The bank has no interest in taking over the motel and running it—it has no such competency. It will be very hard for the bank to sell a money-losing motel and cover their note

It is very simple: If a Patel cannot make the motel run profitably, no one can. The bank’s best option is to work with Papa Patel to make the motel profitable, so the bank is likely to renegotiate terms and try to help Papa Patel get back on track

And they might raise the interest rate to offset the pain they are enduring. It is net, net: Papa Patel still runs the motel; the family still lives there; and he works as hard and as smart as he can to make it—he has no choice. It’s make it work or go bust and homeless

Let’s look at this investment as a bet. There are three possible outcomes. First, the $5,000

First, the $5,000 investment yields an annualized rate of return of 400 percent

Second, the economy goes into a severe recession and business plummets for several years. The bank works with Mr. Patel and renegotiates loan terms as described earlier. Mr. Patel has a zero return on his investment for five years and then starts making $10,000 a year in excess free cash flow when the economy recovers and booms (200 percent return every year after five years)

Third, the economy goes into a severe recession and business plummets. Mr. Patel cannot make the payments and the bank forecloses and Mr. Patel loses his investment. The annualized return is—100 percent

These three outcomes cover virtually the entire range of possibilities. Assume the likelihood of the first option is 80 percent, the second is 10 percent, and the third is 10 percent. These are very conservative probabilities as we are assuming a one in five chance of the motel performing far worse than projected—even though it was bought on the cheap at a distressed sale price and run by a best-of-breed, savvy, low-cost operator

We have unrealistically assumed there is no rise in the motel’s value or in nightly rates over 10 years. Even then, the probability-weighted annualized return is still well over 40 percent. The expected present value of this investment is about $93,400 (0.8 × $111,445 + 0.1 × $42,812). From Papa Patel’s perspective, there is a 10 percent chance of losing his $5,000 and a 90 percent chance of ending up with over $100,000 (with an 80 percent chance of ending up with $200,000 over 10 years). This sounds like a no-brainer bet to me.

Papa Patel does bet it all on one bet, but he has an ace in the hole. If the lender forecloses and he loses the motel, he and his wife can take up jobs bagging groceries, work 60 hours a week instead of 40, and maximize their savings. At the 1973 minimum wage of $1.60, they earn $9,600 a year. After taxes, they can easily sock away $2,000 to $4,000 a year. After two years, Papa Patel could step up to the plate and buy another motel and make another bet. The odds of losing this bet twice in a row are 1 in 100. And the odds that it pays off at least once are roughly 99 percent. When it does pay off, it’s over a 20-fold return. That’s an ultra low-risk bet with ultra-high returns—one very much worth making: Heads, I win; tails, I don’t lose much

Papa Patel is soon flush with cash. He still has a very modest lifestyle. His eldest son comes of age in a few years and he hands over the motel to him. The family buys a modest house and goes hunting for the next motel to buy. This time, they buy a larger motel with 50 rooms. The family no longer lives at the motel, but still does most of the work with little in the way of hired help

There is a snowball effect here and, over time, we end up with these amazing statistics—half of all motels in the United States are under Patel ownership. Having fully cornered the motel market, the Patels have begun buying higher-end hotels and have delved into a number of businesses where they can apply their lowest-cost operator model for unassailable competitive advantage—gas stations

Manilal Chaudhari has embarked on

With no prior U.S. job experience or references and his English language handicap, he had difficulty finding a white-collar accounting job and eventually abandoned that futile effort. Manilal was under pressure to earn money to support his family. He was now pretty much ready to take any job at minimum wage. In the early 1990s, the United States was in a deep recession and that made it all the more difficult. Manilal’s first job was at a gas station at minimum wage. His work hours were 3 PM to 7 AM—16 hours a day, 7 days a week. He was working 112 hours a week

In 1998, Manilal decided that he wanted to buy a small business with his extended family. He considered gas stations, liquor stores, laundromats, and such. His Texaco gas station employer supported his goals, but told him not to look at liquor stores due to the high crime and headaches. Some Patels suggested motels, but in Southern California these now cost millions. He kept looking for a business to buy, but was unable to find one that felt right. He was patient. In 2001, after 9/11, the travel industry went into a major slump and motel occupancy and prices declined significantly

After 9/11, Manilal came across a Best Western motel for sale in Moreno Valley for $4.5 million. It was a spectacular property on nearly three acres right off the highway. They needed to put about $1.4 million down to buy the property. Manilal and his siblings had all of $225,000 in savings. They also had the ability to get about $125,000 through home equity loans on their now appreciated homes

Let’s fast forward four years. The motel’s market value is now over $9 million—a 100 percent increase. But wait. Over the past four years, some of the $3.1 million note has been paid down. Let’s assume about $200,000 was paid down every year, so now the note due is $2.3 million. Their $1.4 million is now worth $6.7 million. That’s an annualized return of a stunning 48 percent a year

Let’s examine the economics here from Manilal’s vantage point. His salary is at least $50,000 a year—a big step up from his Cherokee and gas station days. His family’s $350,000 investment in this “motel bond” yielded an initial annual coupon of about $125,000 a year. It has increased by about $25,000 a year and today is about $200,000. Initially, this bond paid a 36 percent coupon and currently the coupon is 57 percent. In addition, if they decided to sell this bond today, they wouldn’t just get back the $350,000, but nearly $1.7 million—about five times the initial investment in four years

While Papa Patel and Richard Branson seemingly have nothing in common, they are inextricably linked in how they approach their business endeavors

business with minimal capital and virtually no risk—this is Dhandho on steroids

He was also aware that the other businessmen with strong domain knowledge had turned it down. The business plan claimed that the sector was underserved by the existing players. All weekend long he tried calling the other major discount airlines flying that route but could never get through.1 His conclusion was that they either were lousy businessmen or were overwhelmed by demand—which meant that there was an opportunity to start competing against them

He thought about it carefully all weekend long. On Monday, he went to his partners and senior executives at the music business and told them of his interest in starting the airline. They told him, “Richard, you’ve got to be off your rocker

Boeing gave him some ballpark numbers, and Branson figured out that his total outlay and maximum liability for starting Virgin Atlantic Airlines (if it failed) was just $2 million. His record company was on track to earn $12 million that year and $20 million the next year

Branson noted that in the airline business with a single plane, he would pay for the fuel 30 days after the airplane landed and for staff wages 15 to 20 days after the airplane landed, but he would get paid for all the tickets about 20 days before the plane took off

Branson did not go down this path. The “business plan” was done in a weekend and resided in Branson’s head. There was no business plan ever written, there was no board of directors or advisors at startup, no venture capitalists (VCs), or angels. It was done by a person with no prior experience or expertise in the airline industry

Branson found a service gap and went after it. By the time that gap narrowed and British Airways and his other competitors woke up, he had already built a strong brand. Even today, Virgin Atlantic offers a very unique product in a very tough industry. The Virgin Atlantic business model is pure Dhandho. Heads, I win; tails, I don’t lose much

Another example of classic Dhandho is Virgin Mobile, Virgin’s cell phone service in the United States. Virgin Mobile does not own or operate a cell phone network. Sprint provides the entire backend and delivers the service under the Virgin Mobile brand. Virgin targeted teens with this service and focused the offering to be very attractive to teens—cool phones and phone skins, prepaid phone cards, and the teen-centric Virgin brand

The island was on sale for £3,000,000 a few years ago. Branson’s starting offer: £150,000—95 percent off the list price. His offer was laughed at, but a few weeks later he bought the island for just £180,000. Needless to say, Sir Richard has had a very spectacular Dhandho return on his vacation home investment over the years. Now you and 13 other friends can spend time on Necker Island for just $30,000 per night.